In epoca medievale si è molto discusso su alcuni concetti chiave come prova o giustificazione. La teoria della prova contenuta nei trattati di logica medievale prende il nome tecnico di consequentia, che è un tipo di ragionamento fondato sul passaggio dalla concessione (o negazione) di uno o più enunciati denominati antecedenti alla concessione (o negazione) di uno o più enunciati denominati conseguenti. Questo tipo di teoria ha avuto un correlato a livello dei singoli termini che compongono l’enunciato all'interno della teoria (...) nota come suppositio terminorum. Prende, infatti, il nome di descensus, la regola che permette la verifica del passaggio da un termine maggiore (un termine comune) ad un termine minore (che denota individui). La stessa definizione di alcune ramificazioni della teoria della suppositio è col-legata alla possibilità di ammettere o meno il descensus cioè questa "discesa" da un termine comune ad una congiunzione o disgiunzione di termini singolari. Il presente lavoro intende descrivere la teoria del descensus come un tipo particolare di consequentia mostrandone le connessioni con le moderne tecniche logiche. I trattati che si affronteranno appartengono al XIV e al XV secolo, cioè ad un periodo caratterizzato da una sistemazione della materia che li rende confrontabili con un quadro teorico unitario. (shrink)

Il volume intende presentare in una prospettiva organica la letteratura medievale sugli Insolubilia. Gli insolubili sono stati definiti come proposizioni autoreferenziali che hanno origine direttamente dalla tradizione del paradosso del mentitore. L’impostazione del presente lavoro vuole essere sia filologica che teorica in modo che da un lato si possano inserire le analisi speculative sugli Insolubilia in un contesto critico–storico più ampio che restituisca la peculiarità della trattazione medievale, e dall’altro, possa essere effettuata una analisi precisa dei tentativi di soluzione proposti (...) anche attraverso gli strumenti della logica moderna (quando possibile e non fuorviante). (shrink)

This paper is aimed to indicate two new possible Descartes’ sources. As far as the Cartesian theory of free creation of eternal truths is concerned, this doctrine has often been considered as a reaction to the thought of Francisco Suárez. In this article, we tried to demonstrate that there is the possibility of extending the domain of Cartesian references. In this regard, we have focused on Pedro da Fonseca and the Coimbra Commentaries, trying to point out some additional sources in (...) the Cartesian reflection. (shrink)

discussion of contemporary theories of self-consciousness.

This thesis is an exploration of the chapters of Francesco Di Giorgio's Trattati di Architettura, Ingegneria e Arte Militare, that pertain to mechanical devices. While it is difficult to imagine actually constructing Di Giorgio's machines from the drawings and descriptions in his treatises, given their apparent inefficiencies and ambiguities, the Aristotelean science and philosophy referenced throughout the Trattati provides a basis for looking at them as demonstrations of concepts beyond their immediate applications for architecture and engineering. By considering (...) these devices in Di Giorgio's own terms, terms suggested by his own experiences, as well as his writings and paintings, strong associations can be made to the science, philosophy and the theology of his time. (shrink)

Il design industriale è sempre più importante come mezzo per differenziare i prodotti e aumentarne il valore. Allo stesso tempo, la velocità con cui un prodotto viene offerto nel mercato dipende dalla capacità di integrare il design nel processo di produzione. Tuttavia, molte PMI - in particolare le nuove aziende basate sulla tecnologia - mancano di competenze specialistiche nella gestione del design e spesso non prestano sufficiente attenzione a questo aspetto. L'industria automobilistica e le grandi aziende come Philips e Braun (...) gestiscono e misurano l'impatto del design come strumento innovativo. Negli ultimi anni, le aziende industriali che sono in prima linea nella produzione di determinati prodotti stanno iniziando a sperimentare una forte concorrenza che non è egualmente protetta. Subiscono gli impatti dell'esperienza offerta da quasi gli stessi prodotti a prezzi inferiori, grazie a un minore investimento in ricerca e sviluppo, che riduce la struttura dei costi. (shrink)

L’osservazione della natura con l’intento di capire l’origine della varietà di forme e fenomeni in cui si manifesta ha origini remote. All’inizio il rapporto con i fenomeni naturali era dominato da sentimenti quali paura e stupore che conducevano a supporre l’esistenza di entità sfuggenti alla percezione diretta che permeavano gli elementi animandoli. Ecco dunque che la magia rappresenta l’elemento dominante della filosofia naturale primitiva caratterizzata da una unicità degli eventi e dalla impossibilità di capirli e dominarli in quanto frutto della (...) volontà di essenze a noi estranee e non governabili. Con il nascere della civiltà ed il suo progredire il tempo dedicato ai lavori necessari per il sostentamento e la sopravvivenza diminuì e nella ripartizione dei compiti alcuni individui potevano dedicare parte del loro tempo alla osservazione della natura ed alla sua interpretazione in termini non trascendenti. Nella natura, intesa come tutto ciò che ci circonda composto da esseri viventi e da materia inorganica nelle sua varie aggregazioni sulla terra e nel cosmo, ciò che attirò l’attenzione fin dall’inizio furono furono i fenomeni regolari e periodici come i moti della luna, dei pianeti e delle stelle. Nel contempo dopo una spinta iniziale dettata da esigenze pratiche come contare gli oggetti o misurare i campi, la matematica si era sviluppata autonomamente e si rivelò idonea a descrivere in termini quantitativi i moti dei corpi celesti. La terra era al centro dell’universo mentre il moto degli altri corpi celesti risultava da una composizione di moti circolari uniformi. Questa visione geocentrica e pitagorica (armonia delle sfere) dell’universo ha prevalso fino agli albori della scienza moderna, anche se una descrizione eliocentrica, basata su validi argomenti, era stata proposta. Per quanto riguarda la struttura della materia i presocratici avevano già proposto i quattro elementi mentre gli atomisti avevano ricondotto tutto ad entità elementari primigenie, il cui aggregarsi e disgregarsi da luogo a tutti gli stati e le molteplici forme della materia. Queste intuizioni si ritrovano nella fisica moderna che contempla quattro stati di aggregazione, che hanno come unico sostrato comune gli atomi. La fisica moderna nasce con Galileo e Newton, la cui dinamica si sviluppa a partire dalle leggi di Keplero che descrivono il moto dei pianeti nel sistema eliocentrico, per potersi poi applicare ad un qualunque sistema materiale. Pertanto nei due secoli successivi si ritenne che un modello meccanico potesse essere sviluppato per un qualunque sistema fisico e quindi per l’universo intero la cui evoluzione doveva essere matematicamente prevedibile. Per i fenomeni termici tuttavia vennero formulate leggi ad hoc come quelle della termodinamica che mostrano come i processi macroscopici siano irreversibili in contrasto con le leggi della meccanica. Si deve a Boltzmann1 il tentativo di ricondurre la termodinamica alla meccanica per un gran numero di particelle dei cui moti disordinati viene data una lettura di carattere statistico. L’aumento della entropia e la irreversibilità seguono dalla ipotesi di caos molecolare ossia che i moti siano così disordinati che si perde rapidamente memoria dello stato iniziale. L’idea di introdurre una misura di probabilità nel contesto della meccanica sembra antitetica con la natura stessa della teoria rivolta fino ad allora allo studio di sistemi con moti regolari, reversibili e prevedibili individualmente su tempi lunghi. Tuttavia l’analisi probabilistica diventa essenziale per lo studio di sistemi caratterizzati da forti instabilità, e da orbite irregolari per i quali la previsione richiede una conoscenza della condizioni iniziali con precisioni fisicamente non raggiungibili. Combinando la evoluzione deterministica della meccanica di Newton o di Hamilton con la descrizione statistica attraverso una opportuna misura invariante di probabilità nello spazio delle fasi, nasce la teoria dei sistemi dinamici2 che consente di descrivere non solo i sistemi ordinati o i sistemi caotici ma anche tutti quelli che vedono coesistere in diverse proporzioni ordine e caos e che presentano una straordinaria varietà di strutture geometriche e proprietà statistiche, tanto da fornire almeno se non proprio un quadro teorico per lo meno metafore utili per la descrizione dei sistemi complessi. Anche se non c’è unanime consenso ci sembra appropriato definire complessi non tanto sistemi caratterizzati da interazioni non lineari tra i suoi componenti e da proprietà emergenti, che rientrano a pieno titolo nel quadro dei sistemi dinamici, ma piuttosto i sistemi viventi o quelli di vita artificiale che ne condividono le proprietà essenziali3. Tra queste possiamo certamente annoverare la capacità di gestire la informazione e di replicarsi, consentendo tramite un meccanismo di mutazione e selezione di dare origine a strutture di crescente ricchezza strutturale e dotate di capacità cognitive sempre più elaborate. Una teoria dei sistemi complessi non esiste ancora, anche se la teoria degli automi sviluppata da Von Neumann4 e la teoria della evoluzione di Darwin5 ne possono fornire alcuni pilastri importanti. Recentemente la teoria delle reti è stata utilizzata con successo per descrivere le proprietà statistiche delle connessioni tra gli elementi costitutivi (nodi) di un sistema complesso6. Le connessioni che non sono né completamente casuali né completamente gerarchiche, consentono una sufficiente robustezza rispetto a malfunzionamenti o danneggiamenti dei nodi unita a un adeguato livello di organizzazione per consentirne un funzionamento efficiente. Nei sistemi fisici il modello base è un insieme di atomi o molecole interagenti, che danno luogo a strutture diverse quali un gas, un liquido o un cristallo, come risultato di proprietà emergenti. Nello stesso modo per i sistemi complessi possiamo proporre un sistema automi interagenti come modello base. Le molteplici forme che il sistema assume anche in questo caso vanno considerate come proprietà emergenti del medesimo sostrato al mutare delle condizioni esterne e frutto delle i replicazioni, ciascuna delle quali introduce piccole ma significative varianti. Questa è la grande differenza tra un sistema fisico ed un sistema complesso: il primo fissate le condizioni esterne ha sempre le medesime proprietà, il secondo invece cambia con il fluire del tempo perché la sua organizzazione interna muta non solo al cambiare di fattori ambientali ma anche con il succedersi delle generazioni. C’è dunque un flusso di informazione che cresce con il tempo e che consente agli automi costituenti ed alla intera struttura di acquisire nuove capacità. Questo aumento di ordine e ricchezza strutturale avviene naturalmente a spese dell’ambiente circostante, in modo che globalmente i la sua entropia cresce in accordo con la seconda legge della termodinamica. In assenza di una teoria formalizzata paragonabile a quella dei sistemi dinamici, per i sistemi complessi si possono fare osservazioni e misure, sia puntuali sui costituenti elementari e sulle loro connessioni, sia globali sull’intero sistema, oppure costruire modelli suscettibili di essere validati attraverso la simulazione. Se di un sistema si riesce infatti a fornire una descrizione sufficientemente dettagliata, è poi possibile osservare come questo si comporti traducendo le regole in algoritmi e costruendo quindi una versione virtuale, anche se semplificata del sistema stesso. Il passaggio più difficile è il confronto tra il sistema simulato ed il sistema vero, che passa necessariamente attraverso la valutazione di una numero limitato di parametri che ne caratterizzino e proprietà. La codifica del progetto è una proprietà cruciale dei sistemi complessi perché questa si realizza con un dispendio di massa ed energia incomparabilmente più piccolo rispetto a quello necessario per realizzare l’intera struttura; nello stesso tempo apportare piccole modifiche ad un progetto è rapido ed economico. In questo processo che comporta la continua introduzione di varianti si aprono molteplici strade e con lo scorrere del tempo si realizza una storia in modo unico e irripetibile. Anche il susseguirsi di eventi fisici caratterizzati da processi irreversibili e dalla presenza di molteplici biforcazioni da origine ad una storia che non si può percorrere a ritroso, né riprodurre qualora fossimo in grado ripartire dalle stesse condizioni iniziali. Tuttavia esiste una differenza profonda tra la storia di un sistema fisico come il globo terrestre e la storia della vita. La prima registra i molteplici cambiamenti che ha subito la superficie del nostro pianeta ove montagne e mari nascono e scompaiono senza un chiaro disegno soggiacente. La storia della vita è caratterizzata da una progressiva crescita della ricchezza strutturale e funzionale e accompagnata da una crescita della complessità progettuale. La rappresentazione di questa storia prende la forma di un albero con le sue ramificazioni che mostra la continua diversificazione delle strutture e la loro evoluzione verso forme sempre più avanzate. La direzione in cui scorre il tempo è ben definita: le strutture affinano le capacità sensoriali mentre cresce la potenza degli organi che elaborano la informazione. Un sistema complesso è anche caratterizzato da un molteplicità di scale, tanto più alta quanto più si sale sulla scala evolutiva. La ragione è che il procedere verso strutture sempre più elaborate avviene utilizzando altre strutture come mattoni per cui l’immagine che si può fornire è quella di una rete di automi a più strati: partendo dal basso una rete con le sue proprietà emergenti diventa il nodo di una rete di secondo livello, cioè un automa di secondo livello che interagisce con altri automi dello stesso tipo e così via. Nei sistemi inorganici, dove non esiste un progetto, si distinguono di norma solo due livelli, quello dei costituenti elementari e quello su scala macroscopica. I sistemi fisici sono riconducibili a poche leggi universali, che governano i costituenti elementari della materia, ma il passaggio dalla descrizione dalla piccola alla grande scala è impervio e consentito soltanto dalla simulazione numerica, quando ci allontaniamo dalle situazioni più semplici caratterizzate da un equilibrio statistico. I limiti che il disegno riduzionista incontra già per i sistemi fisici diventano decisamente più forti nel caso dei sistemi complessi. (shrink)

Il libro "Homo Sapiens" (Il Mulino) di Giorgio Manzi propone un viaggio attraverso la storia naturale dell’uomo in quanto specie animale. Questa recensione analizza le strategie di comunicazione della scienza dell'autore individuandone pregi e difetti.

‘Metaphysical painting’ (‘pittura metafisica’) is a paradoxical term: extrasensory sensuousness, as it were. Painting is the representation of visible surfaces; metaphysics rejects surfaces, as deceptive, in favour of the deeper essence. But Giorgio de Chirico (1888–1978) who coined the term ‘pittura metafisica’ in 1919 was a follower of the anti-essentialist Nietzsche. ‘Metaphysics’, then, is not about discovering the essence of things but about shaping their appearances, their ‘physique’. This is an intriguing concept and the corollary to a subtle artistic (...) oeuvre. (shrink)

I. Introduzione. I.1. Un’editio minor come sfida aperta. I.2 Per una più selettiva eliminatio. II.1 Sulla storia del problema : l’eredità del XIX secolo (Brandis 1823, Christ 1885, Gercke 1892) nelle edizioni del XX (Ross 1924, Jaeger 1957). II.2. Studi recenti : la necessità di un superamento. II.3. Lo stemma di riferimento : Harlfinger (1979). II.4. L’applicazione dello stemma nel libro Alpha edito da Primavesi. II.5. La revisione dello stemma, proposta per Kappa e Lambda (2009, 2010). II.6. La reazione : (...) discussioni sul ruolo della tradizione β in Kappa e Lambda (2015). III. Una verifica dello stemma in agenda : la divisione delle due famiglie. III.1 Fra i codici β : L’Ambrosianus F 113 Sup. come codex descriptus ? (libri I-IX inc.). III.2. L’ipotesi dell’ interpositus ε e le sue implicazioni sistematiche. III.3 Allievo e maestro nel XV secolo : Matthaios Chamariotes (C) e Giorgio Scholarios, Gennadeios II (Vk). III.4. Il non liquet sulle parti inferiori dello stemma e il concetto di contaminazione. IV.1. Rivedendo lo stemma dall’interno : il problema critico degli errori-guida (Leitfehler). IV.2. Iudicium e valutazione degli errori. IV.3. Errori separativi ed errori congiuntivi secondo la Textkritik di Paul Maas. IV.4. Una verifica importante : il ruolo di γ. V. Un’ipotesi alternativa . V.1. Il testo della Metafisica nei codici poziori. V.2. Un ritorno alla sigla ". V.3. Un nuovo stemma dei codici principali della Metafisica. Appendice : una verifica sull’ipotesi γ. (shrink)

Discussione a partire dal libro di Giorgio Agamben "Karman. Breve trattato sull'azione, la colpa e il gesto", Bollati Boringhieri, 2017.

¿Qué ha pasado con el problema del cardinal del continuo después de Gödel (1938) y Cohen (1964)? Intentos de responder esta pregunta pueden encontrarse en los artículos de José Alfredo Amor (1946-2011), "El Problema del continuo después de Cohen (1964-2004)", de Carlos Di Prisco , "Are we closer to a solution of the continuum problem", y de Joan Bagaria, "Natural axioms of set and the continuum problem" , que se pueden encontrar en la biblioteca digital de mi blog de (...) Lógica Matemática y Fundamentos de la Matemática (ver). También en la entrada "The Continuum Hypothesis" de la web de Enciclopedia de Filosofía de la Universidad de Stanford existe información importante y actualizada al respecto. En esta breve nota se comenta sobre el tema de una manera divulgativa. (shrink)

This chapter is an overview of Giorgio Agamben's engagement, in the Homo Sacer series (1995–2014), with Aristotelian philosophy. It specifically studies Agamben's attempt to deconstruct two Aristotelian conceptual oppositions fundamental for the Western tradition of political thought: (1) that between the bare fact of being alive and "qualified" living (associated by Agamben with an alleged distinction between zōē and bios) and (2) that between potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). Agamben's concept of form-of-life (forma-di-vita), a life that is never "bare" (...) but always in the process of qualifying itself, is designed to deactivate and overcome these distinctions. In the final volume of the series, The Use of Bodies (2014), this is done with the help of the Aristotelian concepts of use (chrēsis) and habit (hexis). (shrink)

This chapter is an overview of Giorgio Agamben's engagement, in the Homo Sacer series (1995–2014), with Aristotelian philosophy. It specifically studies Agamben's attempt to deconstruct two Aristotelian conceptual oppositions fundamental for the Western tradition of political thought: (1) that between the bare fact of being alive and "qualified" living (associated by Agamben with an alleged distinction between zōē and bios) and (2) that between potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). Agamben's concept of form-of-life (forma-di-vita), a life that is never "bare" (...) but always in the process of qualifying itself, is designed to deactivate and overcome these distinctions. In the final volume of the series, The Use of Bodies (2014), this is done with the help of the Aristotelian concepts of use (chrēsis) and habit (hexis). (shrink)

Riflessione sulla temporalità dell'evento a partire dalla pandemia di SARS-CoV2.

The enormous increasing of connections between people and the noteworthy enlargement of domains and methods in sciences have augmented extraordinarily the cardinality of the set of meaningful human symbols. We know that complexity is always on the way to become complication, i.e. a non-tractable topic. For this reason scholars engage themselves more and more in attempting to tame plurality and chaos. In this book distinguished scientists, philosophers and historians of science reflect on the topic from a multidisciplinary point of view. (...) Is it possible to dominate complexity through reductionism? Are there other conceptual instruments useful to take account of complexity? What is complexity in biology, mathematics, physics and philosophy of mind? These are some of the questions which are faced in this volume. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...) and epistemology of visual perception. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...) theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative. (shrink)

Interpretations are generally regarded as the formal representation of the concept of translation.We do not subscribe to this view. A translation method must indeed establish relative consistency or have some uniformity. These are requirements of a translation. Yet, one can both be more strict or more flexible than interpretations are. In this article, we will define a general scheme translation. It should incorporate interpretations but also be compatible with more flexible methods. By doing so, we want to account for methods (...) that seem to imply a sense of translation but are not reducible to interpretations. The main example will be the relative consistent proof between ZF and NBG given by Novak (1950). Further, we will explore a way of combining interpretations. This should account for truth conditions discarded by interpretations in translated theories. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse the ontological import of adding classes to set theories. We assume that this increment is well represented by going from ZF system to NBG. We thus consider the standard techniques of reducing one system to the other. Novak proved that from a model of ZF we can build a model of NBG (and vice versa), while Shoenfield have shown that from a proof in NBG of a set-sentence we can generate a proof in ZF of (...) the same formula. We argue that the first makes use of a too strong metatheory. Although meaningful, this symmetrical reduction does not equate the ontological content of the theories. The strong metatheory levels the two theories. Moreover, we will modernize Shoenfields proof, emphasizing its relation to Herbrands theorem and that it can only be seen as a partial type of reduction. In contrast with symmetrical reductions, we believe that asymmetrical relations are powerful tools for comparing ontological content. In virtue of this, we prove that there is no interpretation of NBG in ZF, while NBG trivially interprets ZF. This challenges the standard view that the two systems have the same ontological content. (shrink)

Abstract: Research on the nature and varieties of the format of cognitive representations in philosophy and cognitive science have been partly shaped by analogies to external, public representations. In this paper, we argue that relying on such analogies contributes to framing the question of cognitive formats in problematic, potentially counterproductive ways. We show that cognitive and public representations differ in many of their central features, making analogies to public representations ill-suited to improving our understanding of cognitive formats. We illustrate these (...) points by examining two case studies in which analogies to public representations may have had a negative impact on research: the 80’s-90’s debate about compositionality and cognitive architecture between symbolicists and connectionists; and contemporary discussions about the nature of visual demonstratives. Finally, we outline an alternative, computational account of formats that does not share the shortcomings of appeal to public representations. (shrink)

In this article, instead of taking a particular method as translation, we ask: what does one expect to do with a translation? The answer to this question will reveal, though, that none of the first order methods are capable of fully represent the required transference of ontological commitments. Lastly, we will show that this view on translation enlarge considerably the scope of translatable, and, therefore, ontologically comparable theories.

Abstract: Research on the nature and varieties of the format of cognitive representations in philosophy and cognitive science have been partly shaped by analogies to external, public representations. In this paper, we argue that relying on such analogies contributes to framing the question of cognitive formats in problematic, potentially counterproductive ways. We show that cognitive and public representations differ in many of their central features, making analogies to public representations ill-suited to improving our understanding of cognitive formats. We illustrate these (...) points by examining two case studies in which analogies to public representations may have had a negative impact on research: the 80’s-90’s debate about compositionality and cognitive architecture between symbolicists and connectionists; and contemporary discussions about the nature of visual demonstratives. Finally, we outline an alternative, computational account of formats that does not share the shortcomings of appeal to public representations. (shrink)

The present work outlines a logical and philosophical conception of propositions in relation to a group of puzzles that arise by quantifying over them: the Russell-Myhill paradox, the Prior-Kaplan paradox, and Prior's Theorem. I begin by motivating an interpretation of Russell-Myhill as depending on aboutness, which constrains the notion of propositional identity. I discuss two formalizations of of the paradox, showing that it does not depend on the syntax of propositional variables. I then extend to propositions a modal predicative response (...) to the paradoxes articulated by an abstraction principle for propositions. On this conception, propositions are “shadows” of the sentences that express them. Modal operators are used to uncover the implicit relation of dependence that characterizes propositions that are about propositions. The benefits of this approach are shown by application to other intensional puzzles. The resulting view is an alternative to the plenitudinous metaphysics of impredicative comprehension principles. (shrink)

Mereological universalists, according to whom every plurality of entities has a fusion, usually claim that most quantifications are restricted to ordinary entities. However, there is no evidence that our usual quantifications over ordinary objects are restricted. In this article I explore an alternative way of reconciling Mereological Universalism with our usual quantifications. I resort to a modest form of ontological expansionism and to the so-called interpretational modalities. Quantifications over ordinary objects are the initial stages of the expansion. From these initial (...) stages, expansions can proceed upwards (fusions of entities in the domain of quantification are added), downwards (parts of entities in the domain are added), and sidewards (entities which are mereologically disjoint from the entities in the domain are added). These expansions are driven by a variety of epistemic and pragmatic reasons and raise different kinds of problems. At each stage, a modalized version of Mereological Universalism is true. By contrast, only at some especially rich stages, standard, non-modalized Mereological Universalism is true as well. Among these especially rich stages, there is a final, metaphysically pre-eminent stage of mereological plenitude. In the last part of the article I discuss some problems and limitations of expansionism. (shrink)

Some arguments against the assumption that ordinary people may share common knowledge are sound. The apparent cost of such arguments is the rejection of scientific theories that appeal to common knowledge. My proposal is to accept the arguments without rejecting the theories. On my proposal, common knowledge is shared by ideally rational people, who are not just mathematically simple versions of ordinary people. They are qualitatively different from us, and theorizing about them does not lead to predictions about our behavior. (...) Nevertheless, models of action that assume common knowledge have a role to play in our understanding of collective rationality. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive theoretical framework that explains both human consciousness and meanings through the working of attention. By arguing for a first-person approach to consciousness, this book offers a critical overview of the major theories and empirical findings on consciousness and attention, and exemplifies how one of the most difficult and fundamental conscious experiences to account for, that is, time, can be analyzed by adopting the kind of semantics developed within the presented theoretical framework: Attentional Semantics.

Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Balaguer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine several notions of consistency with respect to how they can provide a platon-ist epistemology of mathematics. Only a Gödelian notion, we suggest, can provide a satisfactory guide to (...) a platonist ontology. Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Bala-guer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. Balaguer's version of Platonism, Full-Blooded Platonism (FBP), is the view that "there are as many abstract mathematical objects as there could be-i.e., there actually exist abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds" (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381). He continues: Since FBP says that there are abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds, it follows that if FBP is true, then every purely mathematical theory that could be true-i.e., that is internally consistent-accurately describes some collection of actually existing abstract objects. Thus it follows from FBP that in order to acquire knowledge of abstract objects, all we have to do is come up with an internally consistent purely mathematical theory (and know that it is internally consistent). (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381) * To be published in 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium proceedings. (shrink)

Often ZF practice includes the use of the meta-theoretical notion of classes as shorthand expressions or in order to simplify the understanding of conceptual resources. NBG theory expresses formally the internalization of this feature in set theory; in this case, classes, before used metatheoretically, will also be captured by quantifiers of the first order theory. Never- theless there is a widespread opinion that this internalization of classes is harmless. In this context, it is common to refer to the conservativeness of (...) NBG in relation to ZF as a sufficient condition to understand those theories as “equivalent”, attributing a sense of virtuality to the use of classes quantified in NBG. We believe, however, that a technique used to estab- lish relationships between theories is not necessarily neutral in relation to its results - so a conservativeness established through models have different meaning and depth of that rela- tionship established by finitary interpretations. We believe, therefore, that the way in which relationships between theories are established influences the analysis result. In the case of the relationship between NBG and ZF, since NBG is finitely axiomatizible and ZF not, we believe that we have sufficient reasons to assert that the use of different analysis tools may re- veal differences such as expressiveness, ontological commitment and logical conservativeness. Therefore, this project aims to clarify the relationship between these two theories through triangulations between them and the different analysis tools. The use of finitary techniques, in this case, may prove greater expressiveness and ontological commitment of NBG in relation to ZF - relation obscured by an infinitary approach. We believe that, through this research, we can contribute to the debate on the basis of mathematics, denaturalizing the supposedly “equivalent” use of NBG and ZF for this purpose. (shrink)

Many artists, art critics, and poets suggest that an aesthetic appreciation of artworks may modify our perception of the world, including quotidian things and scenes. I call this Art-to-World, AtW. Focusing on visual artworks, in this paper I articulate an empirically-informed account of AtW that is based on content related views of aesthetic experience, and on Goodman’s and Elgin’s concept of exemplification. An aesthetic encounter with artworks demands paying attention to its aesthetic, expressive, or design properties that realize its purpose. (...) Attention to these properties make percipients better able to spot them in other entities and scenes as well. The upshot is that an aesthetic commerce with artworks enlarges the scope of what we are able to see and has therefore momentous epistemic consequences. (shrink)

According to the Maxim of Quality, rational agents tend to speak honestly. Due to the influence of Grice, a connection between linguistic rationality and honesty is often taken for granted. However, the connection is not obvious: structural rationality in language use does not require honesty, any more than it requires dishonesty. In particular, Quality does not follow from the Cooperative Principle and structural rationality. But then what is honest rational speech? I propose to move the discussion in the context of (...) Stalnaker's theory of assertion. From this perspective, although there is no most rational way to behave, Quality follows from the structure of Stalnakerian conversations if interlocutors are sensitive to credibility. In this case, honesty is built on the expectation of reciprocity, and cooperativity is an outcome and not a precondition of rational communication. A benefit of my discussion is that the account of linguistic rationality falls under the more general view of interactive rationality familiar from theoretical economics. (shrink)

Natural language contains simple lexical items for some but not all Boolean operators. English, for example, contains conjunction and, disjunction or, negated disjunction nor, but no word to express negated conjunction *nand nor any other Boolean connective. Natural language grammar can be described by a logic that expresses what the lexicon can express by its primitives, and the rest compositionally. Such logic for propositional connectives is described here as a bilateral extension of update semantics. The basic intuition is that a (...) context can be updated by assertion or by rejection, and by one or multiple propositions at once. These distinctions suffice to characterize the logic of the lexicon. (shrink)

I argue that it is not acceptable to restrict the claim that linguistic types are concrete entities (type-concretism) to some categories of linguistic types (such as words or proper names), while at the same time conceding that other categories of linguistic types (such as sentence types) are abstract entities. Moreover, I suggest a way in which type-concretism can be extended to every linguistic type, thereby responding to the so-called productivity objection to type-concretism, according to which, whenever tokens of a type (...) t are produced in different, causally isolated circumstances, then t needs to be identified by a certain form or structure. This extension of type-concretism detaches type-concretism from so-called originalism and gives rules a prominent role in type-concretism. (shrink)

David Kaplan famously argued that mainstream semantics for modal logic, which identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds, is affected by a cardinality paradox. Takashi Yagisawa showed that a variant of the same paradox arises when standard possible worlds semantics is extended with impossible worlds to deliver a hyperintensional account of propositions. After introducing the problem, we discuss two general approaches to a possible solution: giving up on sets and giving up on worlds, either in the background semantic framework or (...) in the corresponding conception of propositions. As a result, we conclude that abandoning worlds by embracing a truthmaker-based approach offers a promising way to account for hyperintensional propositions without facing the paradoxical outcome. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention (...) and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the “single voice” of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to expose the Cartesian Model of the mind in Cognitive Archaeology and point out how it relates to the questions behind this branch of archaeology. Based on this, some of the premises assumed by the Cartesian Model and how they influence the formulation to the problem of epistemological relativism in the branch are explained. According to this problem, since there is no way to evaluate hypotheses in this research area, the investigations on cognition, based (...) on archaeological evidence, are unjustified. Finally, some alternative approaches to the Cartesian Model and its research agendas are summarized. (shrink)

Introduction to the topical collection "The Structure of Perceptual Objects"—with contributions by Mohan Matthen, EJ Green, Alisa Mandrigin, Blazej Skrzypulec, and Anna Drożdżowicz.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Gestalt psychologists put forward the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, which was meant to replace Fechner’s obscure notion of psychophysical parallelism and provide a heuristics that may facilitate the search for the neural correlates of the mind. However, the concept has generated much confusion in the debate, and today its role is still unclear. In this contribution, I will attempt a little conceptual spadework in clarifying the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, focusing exclusively on conscious (...) visual perceptual experience and its neural correlates. Firstly, I will outline the history of our concept, and its alleged metaphysical and epistemic roles. Then, I will clarify the nature of isomorphism and rule out its metaphysical role. Finally, I will review some epistemic roles of our concept, zooming in on the work of Jean Petitot, and suggest that it does not play a relevant heuristic role. I conclude suggesting that psychoneural isomorphism might be an indicator of robustness for certain mathematical descriptions of perceptual content. (shrink)

I argue for a manipulationist-mechanistic framework for content-NCC research in the case of visual consciousness (Bechtel 2008; Neisser 2012). Reference to mechanisms is common in the NCC research. Furthermore, recent developments in non-invasive brain stimulation techniques (NIBS) lend support to a manipulationist standpoint. The crucial question is to understand what is changed after manipulation of a brain mechanism. In the second part of the paper I review the literature on intentionalism, and argue that intervention on the neural mechanism is likely (...) to change the intentional content of consciousness. This urges us to shift from content-NCC to what I call “intentional mechanisms”. Such mechanisms, it is argued, should be understood as neural prerequisites of conscious visual experience. (shrink)

Communication facilitates coordination, but coordination might fail if there's too much uncertainty. I discuss a scenario in which vagueness-driven uncertainty undermines the possibility of publicly sharing a belief. I then show that asserting an epistemic modal sentence, 'Might p', can reveal the speaker's uncertainty, and that this may improve the chances of coordination despite the lack of a common epistemic ground. This provides a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic modality. The account draws on a standard relational semantics for epistemic modality, Stalnaker's (...) theory of assertion as informative update, and a Bayesian framework for reasoning under uncertainty. (shrink)

The ability to express negation in language may have been the result of an adaptive process. However, there are different accounts of adaptation in linguistics, and more than one of them may describe the case of negation. In this paper, I distinguish different versions of the claim that negation is adaptive and defend a proposal, based on recent work by Steinert-Threlkeld (2016) and Incurvati and Sbardolini (2021), on which negation is an indirect adaptation.

According to the sensorimotor account, vision does not imply theconstruction of internally generated representations of the environment, butit isthe skillful exercise of the sensorimotor contingencies obeying sense-specific laws. In this short study, I focus on the notion of “sensorimotor law” and characterize the kind of explanation providedby the sensorimotor theory as a form of covering law model. I then question the nature of such sensorimotor laws and describe them as mechanisms. I show that a mechanistic interpretation provides a better account (...) of the sensorimotor invariances, which fosters us to rebalance the explanatory burden of sensorimotor action and information. Finally, I show that the question of the roleof representations within the sensorimotor theory should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Cognitive representations are typically analysed in terms of content, vehicle and format. While current work on formats appeals to intuitions about external representations, such as words and maps, in this paper we develop a computational view of formats that does not rely on intuitions. In our view, formats are individuated by the computational profiles of vehicles, i.e., the set of constraints that fix the computational transformations vehicles can undergo. The resulting picture is strongly pluralistic, it makes space for a variety (...) of different formats, and is intimately tied to the computational approach to cognition in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Why do we use epistemic modals like 'might'? According to Factualism, the function of 'might' is to exchange information about state-of-affairs in the modal universe. As an alternative to Factualism, this paper offers a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic possibility operators in a Bayesian setting. The background picture is one whereby communication facilitates coordination, but coordination could fail if there's too much uncertainty, since the players' ability to share a belief is undermined. However, 'might' and related expressions can be used to (...) reveal one's uncertainty, and exploit this to coordinate despite the lack of a common epistemic ground. The final result is a way to articulate a non-Factualist view of epistemic possibility modals that builds on their standard semantics. (shrink)